On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games

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Type: Article
Member Organisation: 001 University of Liverpool

Wooldridge, Michael and Dunne, Paul E. (2004) On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games. Artificial Intelligence, 158 (1). pp. 27-73. ISSN 0004-3702

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We study coalitional games in which agents are each assumed to have a goal to be achieved, and where the characteristic property of a coalition is a set of choices, with each choice denoting a set of goals that would be achieved if the choice was made. Such qualitative coalitional games (QCGs) are a natural tool for modelling goal-oriented multiagent systems. After introducing and formally defining QCGs, we systematically formulate fourteen natural decision problems associated with them, and determine the computational complexity of these problems. For example, we formulate a notion of coalitional stability inspired by that of the core from conventional coalitional games, and prove that the problem of showing that the core of a is non-empty is DP(1)-complete. (As an aside, we present what we believe is the first "natural" problem that is proven to be complete for DP(2).) We conclude by discussing the relationship of our work to other research on coalitional reasoning in multiagent systems, and present some avenues for future research.

Deposited by Dr. Paul E. Dunne on 04 March 2005

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